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REEFER MADNESS: HOW NON-
LEGALIZING STATES CAN REVAMP DRAM 
SHOP LAWS TO PROTECT THEMSELVES 
FROM MARIJUANA SPILLOVER FROM 
THEIR LEGALIZING NEIGHBORS 
JESSICA BERCH* 
Abstract: Reefer madness is sweeping the nation. Despite a federal ban on 
marijuana, states have begun to legalize medical and, increasingly, recreation-
al use of the drug. As more states legalize marijuana, their non-legalizing 
neighbors have seen a distinct uptick in marijuana possession and use—and an 
attendant increase in crime and accidents. In December 2014, Nebraska and 
Oklahoma, non-legalizing states that border Colorado, a trail-blazer in the 
full-legalization movement, requested permission to file suit in the U.S. Su-
preme Court over their neighbor’s lax marijuana controls, which allow canna-
bis to come into their states. The Supreme Court denied leave to file. In the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling, the question remains: What can prohibit-
ing states do to protect themselves from cross-boundary spillover? This Arti-
cle surveys various litigation—and statutory—options and ultimately deter-
mines that prohibiting states should, at a minimum, consider enacting laws 
modeled on Dram Shop Acts, which create liability against those who sell al-
cohol to already intoxicated people or minors who then injure third-party vic-
tims. These revamped “Gram Shop Acts” would create liability against out-of-
state marijuana dispensaries that sell to Home State buyers who, while high, 
injure third parties in the Home State or those who are residents of the Home 
State. Gram Shop Acts may help prohibiting states shift some of the costs of 
marijuana legalization back to those states that foster its use by deterring sales 
to citizens residing in non-legalizing states and by providing compensation to 
third-party victims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Marijuana legalization is sweeping the nation, bringing with it difficult 
legal and policy challenges. Although some states decriminalized marijuana 
in the 1970s,1 most scholars trace the legalization movement to 1996, when 
California became the first state to legalize medical marijuana.2 At that time, 
though, it did not seem that the movement would gain much momentum. In 
fact, within a decade, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to 
regulate the personal, entirely intrastate growth and use of marijuana, even 
when the state in which the growth and use occurred had legalized cannabis.3 
Many thought that the federal law criminalizing marijuana, the Controlled 
Substances Act of 1970 (“CSA”),4 would be read to preempt state medical 
marijuana laws.5 The budding marijuana experiment seemed as if it would 
wither on the vine.6 
Rather than dying out, however, the marijuana movement took root 
and spread like weeds around the country. As of early 2017, thirty or thirty-
                                                                                                                           
 1 In the 1970s, some states decriminalized marijuana so that marijuana possession would be 
punished by issuance of a fine only, not imprisonment. The following states decriminalized mari-
juana, in this sense, during the 1970s: Alaska (1975), California (1976), Colorado (1975), Maine 
(1975), Minnesota (1976), Mississippi (1977), Nebraska (1977), New York (1977), North Caroli-
na (1977), Ohio (1976), and Oregon (1973). See Act effective Sept. 2, 1975, ch. 110, 1975 Alaska 
Sess. Laws; Act of July 9, 1975, ch. 248, 1975 Cal. Stat. 641; Act of July 1, 1975, ch. 115, 1975 
Colo. Sess. Laws 433; Act effective Mar. 1, 1976, ch. 499, 1975 Me. Laws 1273, 1368; Act of 
Mar. 11, 1976, ch. 42, 1976 Minn. Laws 101; Act of Apr. 15, 1977, ch. 482, 1977 Miss. Laws 
922; Act of Apr. 20, 1978, No. 808, § 2, 1978 Neb. Laws 817; Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 360, 1977 
N.Y. Laws 1; Act of July 1, 1977, ch. 862, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1178; Act effective July 1, 1976, 
No. 300, § 1, 1975-1976 Ohio Laws 2311, 2323–24; Act of July 22, 1973, ch. 680, 1973 Or. Laws 
1521. In 1996, Arizona passed a law providing for no incarceration on a first possession charge. 
See Act of Apr. 29, 1997, ch. 246, 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2272. Then, in 2001, Nevada decrimi-
nalized marijuana, and Massachusetts followed suit in 2008. See An Act Establishing a Sensible 
State Marihuana Policy, ch. 387, 2008 Mass. Acts 1571 (2008); Act of June 14, 2001, ch. 592, 
2001 Nev. Stat. 3053. Although decriminalization did away with the stigma of criminal prosecu-
tion, these states did not legalize marijuana. 
 2 Proposition 215, also known as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, was enacted on No-
vember 5, 1996 as the result of an initiative process. The Act was codified in Section 11362.5 of 
the California Public Health and Safety Code. 
 3 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005). 
 4 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 
Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012)). 
 5 Debra Yvonne Hughes, The Supremacy Clause Disappears in a Puff of Smoke—The Effort 
of Medical Marijuana Supporters to Circumvent Federal Law in United States v. Oakland Canna-
bis Buyers’ Cooperative, 26 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 131, 155–61 (2001). For a thorough discussion 
of federal preemption of state marijuana laws, see Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Con-
trolled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5 (2013). 
 6 To scavenger hunt enthusiasts: See how many marijuana references and puns you can find 
seeded in this article. Cf. United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990) (using 215 
movie titles in an opinion in an antitrust action against a movie theater owner). 
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one other jurisdictions7 (depending on whether you count Louisiana)8 have 
joined California in legalizing marijuana9 for either medical or recreational 
use, and each election cycle brings with it the potential for more states to 
join the marijuana scene.10 
In 2012, the legalization trend reached a new high, as Washington and 
Colorado became the first states to legalize entirely recreational, non-
medical use of the drug.11 The once-budding marijuana experiment had 
more than sprouted and spread; it had begun to blossom and bloom. In the 
decade from 1996 to 2006, only ten states legalized medical marijuana,12 
                                                                                                                           
 7 This tally includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam.  
 8 Louisiana law permits doctors to “recommend” marijuana, but contains no protections from 
prosecution for growers or distributors, only the person lawfully possessing medical marijuana. 
See Sen. B. 180 2016 Reg. Sess. (La. 2016). 
 9 See ARK. CONST. amend. XCVIII, § 1–23; COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 14, 16; FLA. 
CONST. art. X, § 29; NEV. CONST. art IV, § 38; ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.37.010–17.37.080, 17.38 
(2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2801–36-2819 (2012); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 11362.1 (West 2017), §§ 11362.5, 11362.7–11362.9 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-
43.3-101–12-43.3-106 (2012), § 12-43.4-10 (2016), § 18-18-406.3 (2012), § 25-1.5-106 (2012); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4901A–4926A (2011); D.C. 
CODE § 7-1671 (2012), § 48-904.01 (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 329-121 to 329-128 (2015); 410 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/1–999 (2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:966 (2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
7, §§ 2441–2454 (2017); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 13-3301–13-3316 (West 2014); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, §§ 1–17 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 333.26421–333.26430 
(2012); MINN. STAT. §§ 152.22–152.37 (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-46-301–50-46-344 
(2011); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 453A.010–453A.810 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 126-X:1–
126-X:11 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:6I-1 to 24:6I-16 (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-
2B-1–26-2B-7 (LexisNexis 2011); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3360–3369-e (McKinney 2015); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3796.01–3796.30 (West 2016); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475b.005–
475b.398, 475b.400–475b.525 (2015); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 10231.101–10231.2110 (2016); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS §§ 21-28.6-1–21-28.6-17 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4472–4474m (2012); 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.51A.005–69.51A.900, 69.50.354 (2015); H.B. 3932, 189th Gen. Court 
(Mass. 2016). For background on legalization trends, see G. M. Filisko, Weed-Whacked: Employ-
ers and Workers Grapple with Laws Allowing Marijuana Use, ABA JOURNAL, Dec. 2015, at 46. Of 
particular interest to the United States because of potential spillover effects, Mexico and Canada 
appear on the verge of legalization. See Dan Levin, As Canada Moves to Legalize Marijuana, Shop 
Owners Ask: Why Wait, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2016, at A6 (regarding Canada); Michael Martinez, 
Mexican Supreme Court Opens Door to Legalizing Marijuana, CNN (Nov. 4, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/04/americas/mexico-supreme-court-legal-marijuana/ 
[https://perma.cc/N7UP-SUFB] (regarding Mexico). 
 10 In November 2016, California, Massachusetts, and Nevada all passed measures legalizing 
recreational marijuana. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1 (West 2017); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § I.P. Question 2, § 1–18 (West 2017); H.B. 3932, 189th Gen. Court (Mass. 2016). In 
December 2016, Maine passed a measure legalizing recreational marijuana. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 7 §§ 2441–2454 (2017). 
 11 Aaron Smith, Marijuana Legalization Passes in Colorado, Washington, CNN MONEY (Nov. 
8, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/07/news/economy/marijuana-legalization-washington-
colorado/ [https://perma.cc/2BPD-RQML]. 
 12 Those states are Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, 
Vermont, and Washington. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; NEV. CONST. art IV, § 38; Medical 
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but between 2006 and 2016, nineteen additional states, Guam, Puerto Rico, 
and the District of Columbia legalized medical or recreational marijuana 
use.13 Popular support for legalization has also spread its purple haze: In 
2015, more than fifty percent of Americans surveyed reported support for 
some form of marijuana legalization.14 Indian tribes had hoped to cash in, in 
the literal sense. A South Dakota tribe had planned to open the first mariju-
ana resort in the country, creating “an adult playground” that would have 
included a “smoking lounge,” a “nightclub, arcade games, bar and food ser-
                                                                                                                           
Use of Marijuana, Ballot No. 215, ch. 135, 1996 Cal. Stat. A-321 (1996); Act No. 228, 2000 Haw. 
Sess. Laws 595 (2000); Act of June 1, 1999, ch. 374, 1999 Me. Adv. Legis. Serv. (1999); Act of 
Nov. 6, 2002, 2004 Mont. Legis. Serv. (2004); Oregon Medical Marijuana Act, ch. 4, 1999 Or. Laws 
5 (1998); Act No. 134, ch. 86, 2004 Vt. Acts & Resolves (2004); Medical Use of Marijuana, ch. 2, 
1999 Wash. Sess. Laws 1 (1998); Alaska Medical Marijuana Act, Measure 8 (1998), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Alaska_Medical_Marijuana_Act,_Measure_8_(1998) [https://perma.cc/S8HY-
DCSW] (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). 
 13 Those states are Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. See FLA. CONST. art. X § 29; Act of 
Apr. 28, 2010, ch. 194, 2010 Ariz. Adv. Legis. Serv. (2010); Arkansas Medical Marijuana 
Amendment of 2016, const. amend. 98, 2016 Ark. Legis. Serv. (2016); Act Concerning the Pallia-
tive Use of Marijuana, Pub. Act No. 12-55, 2012 Conn. Acts 147 (Reg. Sess. 2012); An Act to 
Amend Title 16 of the Delaware Code Creating the Delaware Medical Marijuana Act, ch. 23, 
2011-2012 Del. Laws (2011); Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment Amendment Act 
of 2010, D.C. Law 18-210, 57 D.C. Reg. 34 (Aug. 20, 2010); Act of Aug. 1, 2013, Pub. Act. No. 
98-0122, 2013 Ill. Laws 3015; Act No. 343, 2016 La. Sess. Law Serv. (2016); Act of Apr. 14, 
2014, ch. 256, 2014 Md. Laws 1579; An Act for the Humanitarian Medical Use of Marijuana, ch. 
369, 2012 Mass. Acts 1583 (2012); Medical Marihuana Act, Initiated L. 1, 2008 Mich. Pub. Acts 
(2008); Act of May 29, 2014, ch. 311, 2014 Minn. Laws 2065; An Act Relative to the Use of 
Cannabis for Therapeutic Purposes, ch. 242, 2013 N.H. Laws 556 (2013); Act of Apr. 2, 2007, ch. 
210, 2007 N.M. Laws 2833; Act of July 1, 2010, ch. 37, 2010 N.J. Laws 675; Act of July 5, 2014, 
ch. 90, 2014 N.Y. Laws 744; Marijuana–Use for Medical Purposes, file 83, 2016 Ohio Laws 
(2016) (West); Act No. 2016-16, 2016 Pa. Legis. Serv. (West); An Act Related to Food and 
Drugs—The Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical Marijuana Act, ch. 422, 2005 
R.I. Pub. Laws 2060 (2006); Guam 215-32 (COR), P.L. 32-134 (Feb. 16, 2014); North Dakota 
2016 ballot measures, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/North_Dakota_2016_ballot_measures 
[https://perma.cc/2C59-YXPW] (last visited Feb. 20, 2017); Alexandra Sifferlin, Puerto Rico Gov-
ernor Signs Executive Order to Legalize Medical Marijuana, TIME (May 4, 2015), http://time.
com/3845638/puerto-rico-medical-marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/RZ38-XQMD] (stating that Puerto 
Rico’s governor signed an executive order on May 3, 2015 legalizing medical marijuana). Georgia 
may be state number twenty, although it has legalized only cannabis oil. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-
120–43-34-126 (2015). 
 14 Alex Kreit, The Federal Response to State Marijuana Legalization: Room for Compro-
mise?, 91 OR. L. REV. 1029, 1037 (2013) (“[W]hile Americans remain split roughly evenly in 
their views on marijuana legalization, a sizable majority believes states should have the option to 
pursue legalization laws without federal interference.”); John Faubion, Comment, Reevaluating 
Drug Policy: Uruguay’s Efforts to Reform Marijuana Laws, 19 L. & BUS. REV. AMERICAS 383, 
400 (2013) (noting that the majority of Americans are in favor of the legalization of marijuana); 
Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., 58% Back Legal Marijuana Use, GALLUP (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.
gallup.com/poll/186260/back-legal-marijuana.aspx [https://perma.cc/97TL-ZK85]. 
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vice, and eventually, slot machines and an outdoor music venue.”15 After 
pressure from the state, however, the tribe has put its plans on hold.16 
Even while many states have rushed to legalize marijuana, taking ad-
vantage of the “pot of gold”17 from the tax revenues and marijuana tour-
ism,18 not to mention riding the high of popular support, other states and the 
federal government remain chronically opposed to marijuana legalization.19 
The result is a “canvas [that] looks like one that Jackson Pollock got to 
first”20—a splattering of mismatched laws regulating marijuana use 
throughout the nation. Some states permit marijuana use for recreational 
and medical purposes, some permit it for medical purposes only, and others 
forbid its use altogether.21 The federal government, through the CSA, pro-
hibits the transportation and sale, and even personal possession and use, of 
marijuana.22 These conflicting laws raise interesting legal issues, leading 
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky to say that the patchwork of laws has created 
“one of the most important federalism conflicts in a generation.”23  
                                                                                                                           
 15 Regina Garcia Cano, South Dakota Tribe to Open Nation’s 1st Marijuana Resort, ASSOCI-
ATED PRESS (Sept. 29, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/b759278274a94be89e6e4f3793b8c009/
south-dakota-tribe-open-nations-1st-marijuana-resort [https://perma.cc/JF5Z-CN8J]. 
 16 Mark Walker & Katie Nelson, Flandreau Sioux Put Marijuana Resort on Hold, USA TO-
DAY (Nov. 8, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/11/08/flandreau-
sioux-tribe-marijuana/75426270/ [https://perma.cc/CM8R-7VRF].  
 17 Credit goes to Professor Michael Vitiello for this pun. See Michael Vitiello, Legalizing 
Marijuana: California’s Pot of Gold?, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 1349, 1349, 1376 (discussing marijua-
na legalization). 
 18 See Cano, supra note 15 (noting that the Santee Sioux tribe in South Dakota would have 
generated “$2 million a month in profit” from marijuana). 
 19 Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Over-
looked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1470 (2009) (discussing “[t]he 
federal government’s campaign against marijuana”) [hereinafter Mikos, Limits of Supremacy]; see 
also Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to Med-
ical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 640 (2011) (highlighting “the federal govern-
ment’s hostility toward marijuana”). 
 20 Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013) (discussing the “special and small cate-
gory” of arising-under federal question cases where the plaintiff’s cause of action lies in state law, 
but federal law supplies one of the elements). 
 21 See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text (explaining which states legalized marijuana 
and when). 
 22 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), Sch. I(c)(10) (2012) (classifying marijuana, “marihuana,” as a Schedule 
I drug, the most restricted type). Drugs listed on Schedules II–V may be prescribed for medical 
treatment, but Schedule I drugs may not. See id. § 829. Regulations do permit certain clinical trials 
on cannabidiol, an extract from the marijuana plant. See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.18 (2016) (discussing 
research protocols for a Schedule I controlled substance); see also U.S. Drug Enf’t Agency, DEA 
Eases Requirements for FDA-Approved Clinical Trials on Cannabidiol, DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCY (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.dea.gov/divisions/hq/2015/hq122315.shtml [https://perma.
cc/H8DP-6E8D]. 
 23 Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA 
L. REV. 74, 77 (2015). 
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Because some states permit what the federal government expressly 
criminalizes, the vertical federalism issues in the marijuana experiment 
loom large. So, since the first legalization laws were passed, scholars, poli-
ticians, courts, and attorneys have tried to resolve how legalizing states 
could permit marijuana sales and use when the federal government forbids 
those very activities.24 Legal academics soon developed a three-part solu-
tion. First, they concluded that the CSA does not occupy the field of drug 
regulation or expressly preempt state laws respecting personal use and pos-
session of marijuana, as long as there is no “positive conflict” between the 
federal and state laws.25 Second, no direct conflict arises between the CSA 
and the seemingly contrary state laws, as those state laws merely permit, but 
do not require, marijuana growth, sale, possession, or use. A person may 
comply with both the CSA and state legalization laws by simply abstaining 
from marijuana.26 To be blunt, no state would order its citizens to violate 
the CSA. Most obviously, such a law would make the state vulnerable to 
harsh reprisals by the federal government, which, though generally hands-
off regarding marijuana, would roll in to stop that type of law.27 Finally, the 
federal government cannot force states to enforce federal marijuana policy 
because of the anti-commandeering proscriptions of the U.S. Constitution, 
which forbid the federal government from conscripting state officers into 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See, e.g., id. at 90–100 (discussing problems that arise in banking, tax law, access to law-
yers, employment, probation and parole, and family law); Todd Grabarsky, Conflicting Federal 
and State Medical Marijuana Policies: A Threat to Cooperative Federalism, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 
1, 2 (2013) (noting that “unpredictable enforcement by federal authorities in states that have legal-
ized medical marijuana not only threatens state drug policy, but also the efficacy of federal en-
forcement” and advocating that Congress “carve out an exemption from federal enforcement in 
states that have legalized the drug”). 
 25 See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 23, at 105–06 (“The phrase ‘positive conflict . . . so that 
the two cannot consistently stand together’ in section 903 has been interpreted as narrowly re-
stricting the preemptive reach of the CSA to ‘cases of an actual conflict with federal law such that 
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility.’”) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. Blasting Servs., Inc. v. Wilkes County, 288 F.3d 
584, 591 (4th Cir. 2002)); Michael A. Cole, Jr., Functional Preemption: An Explanation of How 
State Medicinal Marijuana Laws Can Coexist with the Controlled Substances Act, 16 MICH. ST. 
U. J. MED. & L. 557, 563 (2012) (“The CSA does not contain any express preemption language 
anywhere in the text of the statute; thus, it cannot expressly preempt state medical marijuana 
law.”); Mikos, supra note 5, at 11–13 (discussing how Congress chose to preempt state laws on 
drugs); see also 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (preemption provision). 
 26 See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 23, at 106 (stating that an individual could comply with 
both federal law and state law unless “a state law required a citizen to possess, manufacture, or 
distribute marijuana in violation of federal law”). 
 27 See id. at 77 (noting that President Obama’s administration allowed marijuana “state policy 
experiments” to take place). It is unclear how President Trump will handle state experimentation with 
marijuana. See, e.g., Kurtis Lee, What is the Future of Recreational Marijuana in Trump’s America?, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-legal-marijuana-future-2017-story.
html [https://perma.cc/ZB9X-MYGZ]. 
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enforcing federal law such as the federal marijuana ban.28 As a result of the 
joint preemption and anti-commandeering analysis, most experts agree that, 
as long as the federal government chooses not to enforce its anti-marijuana 
laws, states may comfortably allow legal medical and even recreational ma-
rijuana.29 This solution to the vertical federalism problem permits the pro-
liferation of the paint splatters on the Jackson Pollock canvas—and the en-
trenchment of the “most pressing and complex federalism issue of our 
time.”30 
That states may choose to legalize what the federal government crimi-
nalizes does not imply a lack of friction created by marijuana’s dual sta-
tus.31 To the contrary, people lawfully using marijuana under state law may 
lose their employment.32 Parolees with lawful state medical marijuana cards 
may nonetheless be denied the drug as a condition of parole in some juris-
dictions.33 Federally insured banks may decline to accept money from mari-
                                                                                                                           
 28 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (“Con-
gress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling 
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”) (alternation in original) (quoting Hodel 
v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)); see also Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (explaining that Congress cannot force the states to follow a 
federal program nor can it force the states’ officers to do so); Kreit, supra note 14, at 1035 (stating 
that anti-commandeering proscriptions prevent the federal government from requiring state and 
local governments to prosecute marijuana cases). 
 29 Scholars have acknowledged that the two systems—state legalization and federal prohibi-
tion—may exist side-by-side. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 23, at 78 (advocating “a coopera-
tive federalism approach that allows states meeting criteria specified by Congress or the [Depart-
ment of Justice] to opt out of the federal [CSA] provisions relating to marijuana”); Mikos, Limits 
of Supremacy, supra note 19, at 1422 (“[S]tate laws legalizing conduct banned by Congress re-
main in force and, in many instances, may even constitute the de facto governing law of the 
land.”). 
 30 David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal 
Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 569 (2013). 
 31 The problems associated with marijuana legalization are well documented. See Chemerin-
sky et al., supra note 23, at 90–100 (discussing issues related to marijuana that arise in multiple 
areas of law). 
 32 For example, in June 2015, a paraplegic in Colorado lost his lawsuit against his former 
employer, Dish Network, which had fired him for testing positive for having medical marijuana in 
his system. Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849, 852–53 (Colo. 2015). The state of Colo-
rado has legalized marijuana for medical and recreational use. Id. at 850. Mr. Coats had a state-
issued license to use medical marijuana. Id. He “consume[d] medical marijuana at home, after 
work, and in accordance with his license and Colorado state law.” Id. The court concluded that 
medical marijuana use—illegal under federal law, though legal under state law—is not a “lawful” 
activity. Id.  
 33 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.795(b) (West 2007) (stating that a parolee with 
a medical marijuana card may seek permission to use medical marijuana). But see Reed-Kaliher v. 
Hoggatt, 347 P.3d 136, 140 (Ariz. 2015) (holding that a probation condition prohibiting medical 
marijuana use that would comply with the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act is “unenforceable and 
illegal”). 
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juana commerce because of the threat of money laundering prosecutions, 
leaving the businesses largely cash-only and cash-on-site.34 Marijuana dis-
pensaries may not deduct business expenses from their federal taxes.35 
Lawyers may encounter ethical dilemmas advising marijuana businesses 
because attorneys cannot knowingly assist clients in illegal conduct, even if 
that conduct is legal in the state in which the lawyer practices or the client 
acts.36 These problems arise because state laws permit what federal law 
prohibits. They present quintessential vertical federalism issues, which have 
been robustly explored by the legal academy.37 
Other problems also arise from marijuana’s conflicted status. For ex-
ample, residents of non-legalizing states may visit legalizing states, pur-
chase marijuana, and then bring it home;38 or they may consume the drug in 
the legalizing state and return home or enter another prohibiting state39 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 
601–02 (2015) (discussing the problems associated with banking for marijuana-related businesses, 
including lack of bank accounts, difficulty in securing loans, and the public safety concerns raised 
by this cash-only business); Serge F. Kovaleski, Banks Say No to Marijuana Money, Legal or Not, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, at A1 (“Banking is the most urgent issue facing the legal cannabis 
industry today.”). But see William Baude, State Regulation and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 513, 516–17 (2015) (“[F]ederal law likely does not allow banks to serve 
the [marijuana] industry, though recent enforcement guidance indicates that these rules will not be 
enforced against banks that comply with certain additional requirements.”). 
 35 See generally Edward J. Roche, Jr., Federal Income Taxation of Medical Marijuana Busi-
nesses, 66 TAX LAW. 429 (2013) (discussing the problem that arises because federal tax law disal-
lows deductions for ordinary and necessary business expenses for marijuana businesses). 
 36 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer shall 
not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent . . . .”); see also Alec Rothrock, Is Assisting Medical Marijuana Dispensaries Hazard-
ous to a Lawyer’s Professional Health?, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (2012) (explaining that 
a lawyer who provides legal services to a marijuana dispensary violates Colorado Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 1.2(d) because that conduct is criminal under federal law). In addition, a dual-
licensed lawyer from a prohibiting state who has a multi-state practice may face discipline if, from 
a prohibiting state, he advises a client in a permitting state how to legally (under the permitting 
state’s laws) set up a marijuana business, as that conduct may be criminal under the laws of the 
lawyer’s home state, as well as federal law. 
 37 See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text (discussing the legal academy’s solution to 
marijuana’s vertical federalism problem). 
 38 See Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 868 (2004) 
(noting how a marijuana user in a state where marijuana is illegal faces incentives to travel to a near-
by state where marijuana is legal to purchase it and bring it back home). Cross-boundary spillover 
has become a problem in other countries as well. After some cities in Amsterdam restricted foreign-
ers from purchasing and consuming marijuana in coffee shops, “[p]eople still come from neighboring 
countries to score marijuana, but now they stock up [from street dealers] and head back home in a 
day.” Winston Ross, Holland’s New Marijuana Laws Are Changing Old Amsterdam, NEWSWEEK 
(Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/marijuana-and-old-amsterdam-308218 [https://perma.cc/
UKQ9-2CY3]. 
 39 This Article interchangeably uses the terms “prohibiting state” and “non-legalizing state” to 
mean a state that has legalized neither medical nor recreational marijuana use. 
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while under marijuana’s influence.40 Such activity places extra burdens on 
law enforcement and other social systems in the non-legalizing states.41 In 
fact, statistics confirm an increase in illegal marijuana trafficking in and 
around states that have legalized marijuana.42 Statistics further reflect more 
drug arrests,43 increases in the amounts of drugs seized,44 and other cross-
boundary spillover.45 These horizontal-federalism problems will only be-
come more acute for non-legalizing states as more states join the legaliza-
tion faction, creating more spillover into the declining number of prohibit-
ing states.46 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See Trevor Hughes, In Tiny Nebraska Towns, a Flood of Colorado Marijuana, USA TODAY 
(June 11, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/11/colorado-marijuana-exports/
9964707/ [https://perma.cc/E5KQ-BAK5] (noting the “massive influx of marijuana flowing into and 
through [Nebraska] communities” from Colorado dispensaries). To be fair, this Article relies on 
some of the more extreme statistics available. Though the numbers are disputed, they do show that 
there is at least some increase in marijuana spillover into neighboring, non-legalizing states. 
 41 See Trevor Hughes, Sheriffs Sue Colorado Over Legal Marijuana, USA TODAY (Mar. 5, 
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/03/05/sheriffs-from-three-states-sue-colorado-
over-marijuana/24385401/ [https://perma.cc/6X24-324X] (“The out-of-state sheriffs say the flow 
of Colorado’s legal marijuana across the border has increased drug arrests, overburdened police 
and courts and cost them money in overtime. Felony drug arrests in the town of Chappell in Deuel 
County, Neb., 7 miles north of the Colorado border, jumped 400% over three years . . . . Police 
officers monitoring the flow of marijuana outside Colorado say volumes have risen annually.”). 
 42 See Jenny Deam, Colorado’s Neighbors Dismayed by New Wave of Marijuana Traffic, 
L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pot-trafficking-20140527-story.
html#page=1 [https://perma.cc/Y7Z2-HJVZ] (describing a 20% increase in marijuana-related 
arrests in Sidney, Nebraska and a four-fold increase in marijuana-related charges); David Hendee, 
Nebraska on its Own with Drug Enforcement Costs Tied to Colorado Pot Sales, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD (Apr. 20, 2014), http://m.omaha.com/news/nebraska-on-its-own-with-drug-enforcement-
costs-tied-to/article_d76f74a4-b109-5080-9d7b-4e26264686bc.html?mode=jqm [https://perma.cc/
U5YM-K583] (noting that Colorado marijuana can be found throughout the country); The Denver 
Channel, Colorado Weed Blamed for Increasing Law Enforcement Costs in Nebraska, YOUTUBE 
(May 25, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y0JocQFv2IE [https://perma.cc/C7PW-GYVB] 
(indicating that marijuana from Colorado has increased a Nebraska town’s jail budget by more 
than $100,000); see also ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIDTA, THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN 
COLORADO: THE IMPACT 38 (2013) (listing a 407% increase in Colorado “marijuana interdiction 
seizures destined for other states”). 
 43 See Hughes, supra note 41 (noting that felony drug arrests increased by 400%). 
 44 See ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIDTA, supra note 42, at 38 (noting that the amount of seized 
marijuana destined for other states increased by 407%). 
 45 See Baude, supra note 34, at 518 (discussing Colorado marijuana’s diversion to other states); 
Marc Fisher, Colorado’s Marijuana Policy Raises Nearby States’ Costs, LINCOLN J. STAR (July 28, 
2014), http://journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/colorado-s-marijuana-policy-raises-nearby-
states-costs/article_ee5ed264-1203-5a02-9e14-3ac4b27f61f9.html [https://perma.cc/C4GS-7AQJ]. 
 46 See Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 543 (2006) (“[S]pillovers . . . would be concentrated in states 
bordering on the legalizing jurisdictions or otherwise in close proximity to them.”). Professor 
Somin suggests that, through Coasean bargaining, if a legalizing state inflicts harm on a neighbor-
ing state, the neighbor “can cut a deal with [the legalizing state] to get it to change its policies.” Id. 
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The cross-boundary spillover effects present quintessential horizontal-
federalism problems. In stark contrast to the blaze of discussion regarding 
the vertical-federalism issues, the legal academy has been virtually silent on 
these horizontal-federalism issues, despite the obvious salience to state 
leaders and citizens and the intriguing federalism, jurisdiction, and choice-
of-law questions raised.47 
This Article strives to help fill that gap. It surveys potential responses 
prohibiting states may take to prevent the negative effects of marijuana from 
wafting across state lines into their states from their more permissive neigh-
bors. It proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews litigation responses and assess-
es their likelihood of success.48 Part II explores potential statutory responses, 
and focuses on the “Gram Shop Act” as a minimally intrusive option that still 
supplies some measure of protection for non-legalizing states.49 A Gram Shop 
Act, like its namesake, the Dram Shop Act, would create liability against out-
of-state marijuana dispensaries that sell to Home State buyers who, while 
high, injure third parties in the Home State or those who are residents of the 
Home State. It further explores both the benefits and potential shortcomings 
of such a law as a method of compensation and deterrence. Finally, Part III 
reviews the legal viability of such gram shop laws, including the personal 
jurisdiction, choice-of-law, and constitutional challenges that may be leveled 
against their use to impose liability on out-of-state dispensaries.50 
Although states may serve as laboratories of democracy to “try novel 
social and economic experiments,” such as the marijuana experiment, these 
entrepreneurial states must do so “without risk to the rest of the country.”51 
The cross-boundary spillover shows that the marijuana experiment has 
failed to remain cabined within legalizing states. When the effects of such 
experiments waft outside the laboratory walls, their neighbors should be 
                                                                                                                           
 47 But see Brannon P. Denning, State Legalization of Marijuana as a “Diagonal Federalism” 
Problem, 11 FIU L. REV. 349, 349 (2016) (explaining that state legalization partakes of both verti-
cal federalism problems and horizontal ones); Brannon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizon-
tal Federalism, and Legal Obstacles to State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 567, 587–92 (2015) (discussing horizontal federalism and spillover effects); see also Bran-
non P. Denning, One Toke over the (State) Line: Constitutional Limits on “Pot Tourism” Re-
strictions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2279, 2283–84 (2014) (discussing how Colorado distinguishes be-
tween residents and non-residents purchasing marijuana). See generally Chad DeVeaux & Anne 
Mostad-Jensen, Fear and Loathing in Colorado: Invoking the Supreme Court’s State-Controversy 
Jurisdiction to Challenge the Marijuana-Legalization Experiment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1829 (2015) 
(exploring the possibility that neighboring states may invoke the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction to challenge legalization). 
 48 See infra notes 52–71 and accompanying text. 
 49 See infra notes 72–141 and accompanying text. 
 50 These issues will be more robustly discussed in a future article, currently in draft and on 
file with the author. See infra notes 142–151 and accompanying text. 
 51 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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able to protect themselves. This Article helps clear the smoke for those 
neighbors, allowing them to find some protection. 
I. LITIGATION RESPONSES 
When someone harms us, our first reaction is often to “sue the bas-
tard!” In December 2014, Nebraska and Oklahoma did just that, invoking 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, and arguing that the CSA 
preempts Colorado’s laws and regulations permitting use of the newly legal-
ized drug.52 The lawsuit alleged that “Colorado has created a dangerous gap 
in the federal drug control system,” enabling marijuana to “flow[] from 
[Colorado] into neighboring states, undermining Plaintiff States’ own mari-
juana bans, draining their treasuries, and placing stress on their criminal 
justice systems.”53 The Court nipped the suit in the bud, refusing to grant 
Nebraska and Oklahoma leave to file.54 
The suit may have failed for a variety of reasons, in addition to the 
Court’s discretionary docket, including lack of standing and failure to plead 
with sufficient particularity.55 Standing requires the plaintiff to have suf-
fered an injury-in-fact.56 Where, as here, a plaintiff who is not the enforcing 
officer alleges non-enforcement of a law, the plaintiff lacks a personal stake 
in its enforcement.57 In addition, when invoking the Supreme Court’s origi-
nal jurisdiction, a complaint “must allege . . . facts that are clearly sufficient 
to call for a decree in its favor.”58 Nebraska and Oklahoma generically 
pointed to a “significant increase in the trafficking of marijuana,” but failed 
to cite more specific statistics in their complaint.59 It is worth noting that 
Nebraska and Oklahoma have not refiled their complaint in district court, 
perhaps signaling that the leaders in those states, too, understand the fail-
ures in their litigation theory. 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See Complaint at 28, Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (No. 22O144). 
 53 See id. at 3–4. 
 54 See Nebraska v. Oklahoma, 136 S. Ct. 1034, 1034 (2016). But see id. (Thomas & Alito, 
J.J., dissenting from the denial of motion for leave to file). 
 55 See DeVeaux & Mostad-Jensen, supra note 47, at 1832–33. Professors DeVeaux and Mo-
stad-Jensen also posited that the complaint should have failed because of the anti-commandeering 
proscriptions of the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 1883–89; see also supra note 28 and accompany-
ing text (noting how anti-commandeering proscriptions prevent the federal government from re-
quiring states to enforce federal marijuana laws). 
 56 E.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 
(2000) (discussing standing requirements). 
 57 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013). 
 58 Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934). 
 59 See Complaint, supra note 52, at 8. 
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Perhaps other suits brought by non-legalizing states are not doomed. 
Rather than relying on preemption analysis, Professors DeVeaux and Mo-
stad-Jensen suggest that non-legalizing plaintiff states should invoke federal 
nuisance law, asking the Court to award damages to the plaintiff states in an 
amount sufficient to cover the cost of remediating the harms foisted on 
them by their neighbors’ legalization.60 That way, legalizing states, like 
Colorado, would be forced to bear the true costs of their legalization exper-
iments. Under the theory advocated by Professors DeVeaux and Mostad-
Jensen, if marijuana legalization still proves profitable and politically palat-
able after these expenses are deducted, states like Colorado will maintain 
marijuana’s legal status, but will pay for the privilege. In turn, non-
legalizing states will be able to retain their prohibitions, but with the re-
sources to pay for the emanations from drug legalization that manifest 
themselves within their borders. If, however, the marijuana experiment 
proves unprofitable once legalizing states must compensate non-legalizing 
states for the costs inflicted on them, then the great marijuana experiment 
will burn itself out and go up in smoke—not because of heavy-handed or 
moralistic regulation, but because of economic realities.61 
So far, no states have invoked the federal nuisance theory. In fact, 
since Nebraska and Oklahoma initiated their suit against Colorado, only one 
other suit has been filed by angry extraterritorial neighbors, though admit-
tedly even this suit includes in-state plaintiffs.62 County sheriffs in Colora-
do, Nebraska, and Kansas sued Colorado alleging that its legalization cre-
                                                                                                                           
 60 Professors DeVeaux and Mostad-Jensen contend that injunctions, unlike damages, tread too 
deeply on the legalizing states’ sovereign authority. See generally DeVeaux & Mostad-Jensen, 
supra note 47, at 1181–96 (describing how those trafficking Colorado pot to neighboring states 
should face the remedy of damages). 
 61 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (describing 
that, in a world without transaction costs, people would bargain to the most efficient allocation of 
resources and how the low point should produce outcomes similar to ones that would result in the 
transaction-cost-free world). This analysis may not capture the full picture with respect to mariju-
ana legalization. States legalize not just because marijuana is profitable in terms of taxes and tour-
ism revenue, but also because the costs of the War on Drugs, both literally (incarceration) and 
socially (making criminals out of a substantial percentage of the population), has proved unpalata-
ble. If this is true, then even if the damages imposed by the lawsuits cost legalizing states more 
money than legalization brings in, these states may continue to support legalization for these so-
cial and political reasons. Or, perhaps, these states will simply decriminalize cannabis, rather than 
legalize it. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (regarding decriminalization in the 1970s). 
 62 Additional suits have been filed by in-state citizens. In one, a Colorado hotel owner alleges 
that marijuana sales from a proposed dispensary will harm his business. Complaint, Safe Sts. All. 
v. Med. Marijuana of the Rockies, LLC, No. 15-cv-00350 (D. Colo. filed Feb. 19, 2015) (com-
plaining about a state-licensed dispensary scheduled to open fewer than seventy-five yards from 
the plaintiff’s hotel). In another, a Colorado landowner argues that marijuana is decreasing his 
property values. Complaint, Safe Sts. All. v. Med. Marijuana of the Rockies, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-
00349 (D. Colo. filed Feb. 19, 2015). 
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ates a “crisis of conscience” as law enforcement officers must decide 
whether to violate the Colorado Constitution (permitting the sale) or United 
States law (the “supreme” law of the land, which currently prohibits mariju-
ana sales).63 The district court dismissed the case, noting that the CSA does 
not create a private right of action and that the plaintiffs cannot engraft a 
private right of action onto the CSA by using preemption analysis.64 
The state-versus-state litigation efforts appear to have burned out. 
What other options exist for the prohibiting states? Every day prohibiting 
states suffer from the externalities of marijuana legalization—increased 
numbers of car accidents,65 hospital use,66 short- and long-term health con-
sequences for their citizens,67 drug trafficking arrests, incarceration costs, 
lost productivity in the workplace,68 and simply a steady and increased flow 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Smith v. Hickenlooper, 164 F. Supp. 3d 1286, 1286 (D. Colo. 2016). These sheriffs’ 
“crisis of conscience” reminds one of Kim Davis, the county clerk who had her own crisis of con-
science and could not, consistent with her personal religious belief, bring herself to issue marriage 
licenses to gay couples, despite clear law requiring her to do so. See Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-
00044-DLB (E.D. Ky. filed Aug. 12, 2015); see also Garrett Epps, When Public Servants Refuse 
to Serve the Public, ATLANTIC (Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2015/08/religious-freedom-gay-marriage/401390/ [https://perma.cc/8BRH-UVXV]. The difference 
in the sheriffs’ case may lie in the fact that it is not their personal beliefs—but rather federal law—
that provides the counterpoint. 
 64 See Smith, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 1290–91. 
 65 See Faubion, supra note 14, at 402 (“Perhaps most importantly, the short-term motor func-
tion impairment accompanying ‘acute intoxication’ results in difficulty operating motor vehicles, 
presenting the greatest health and safety risk.”); id. at 406 (noting a potential for “increase in the 
amount of traffic accidents resulting from driving under the influence”); see also supra notes 40–
45 and accompanying text (discussing negative consequences of marijuana). 
 66 See Faubion, supra note 14, at 407 (citing studies regarding “lower life satisfaction, poorer 
mental and physical health, relationship problems, and less academic and career success,” in addi-
tion to “higher risk of heart attack,” “respiratory illnesses, hallucinations, and paranoia”); see also 
OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY MARIJUANA RES. CTR., THE PUBLIC HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES OF MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, http://www.asapaz.com/resources/The
PublicHealthConsequencesofMarijuanaLegalization.pdf [https://perma.cc/PS4D-P2RT] (“Evidence 
shows our drug problem is a major public health and safety threat . . . . Legalizing drugs would 
increase their availability and normalize their use, leading to increased negative health conse-
quences, particularly among young people.”); David G. Evans, Marijuana Legalization’s Costs 
Outweigh Its Benefits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/
debate-club/should-marijuana-use-be-legalized/marijuana-legalizations-costs-outweigh-its-benefits 
[https://perma.cc/PP34-ZUWZ] (“Marijuana use accounts for tens of thousands of marijuana re-
lated complaints at emergency rooms throughout the United States each year.”). 
 67 See Faubion, supra note 14, at 404–07 (noting “loss in IQ points over time,” “acute short-
term memory loss, slowed reaction time and impaired motor coordination, altered judgment and 
decision-making, and increased heart rate”). 
 68 See id. at 407 (comparing income from alcohol and tobacco taxes to its costs in terms of 
health care, criminal justice, and lost productivity and concluding that “[i]t seems clear that regu-
lation of marijuana would likely add to a deficit, rather than eliminate one”). 
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of illegal marijuana across state lines.69 Importantly too, these prohibiting 
states may wish to express moral condemnation regarding drug culture, and 
so they may not wish to simply join the party and legalize the drug and, in 
fact, may wish to take an affirmative stance against marijuana. Without in-
novative protections, non-legalizing states will continue to suffer harm be-
cause legalizing states have economic and social incentives to continue to 
sell marijuana, including increases in taxes, tourism, business, and em-
ployment.70 To ameliorate these harms, non-legalizing states should consid-
er taking statutory action to redress the wrongs, either in addition to litiga-
tion or in lieu of it.71 
II. STATUTORY RESPONSES 
Section A discusses criminal penalties as a method to decrease mariju-
ana spillover into non-legalizing states.72 Section B explores the “Gram 
Shop Act.”73  
A. Criminal Penalties 
One option that a non-legalizing state might consider is to increase 
criminal penalties for marijuana possession and use, thus attempting to de-
ter individuals from transporting marijuana across the border into a prohib-
iting state. After all, “[i]f the sanctions that presently attach to a violation 
. . . do not provide sufficient deterrence,” then, according to one school of 
thought, the “sanctions should be made more severe.”74 For example, feder-
al law currently permits sentences of up to one year for possession of mari-
juana.75 If the prohibiting state mirrors that penalty, and it appears that the 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See O’Hear, supra note 38, at 868 (“Thus, liberalizing the [marijuana] laws in one state 
may make drugs cheaper and more readily available to the residents of other states, thus under-
mining the ability of get-tough states to achieve their preferences to be drug-free.”); Somin, supra 
note 46, at 542 (“[T]he danger is that medical marijuana produced in one state might find its way 
into illegal drug markets in neighboring states.”). 
 70 See O’Hear, supra note 38, at 859 (“[S]tates do not themselves experience these spillover 
effects, [so] each [legalizing] state has an incentive to adopt policies that overproduce negative 
externalities and underproduce positive externalities.”). Professor O’Hear concludes that this state 
of affairs cries out for “federal intervention,” rather than protective measures by the non-legalizing 
state. Id. 
 71 See David S. Rubenstein, Self-Help Structuralism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1619, 1620 (2015) 
(“Self-help enclaves in the law permit an actor to take otherwise unlawful action to redress anoth-
er’s wrongdoing. . . . Whether for reasons of fairness or efficiency, the law sometimes permits 
actors to take matters into their own hands.”). 
 72 See infra notes 74–95 and accompanying text. 
 73 See infra notes 96–141 and accompanying text. 
 74 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001). 
 75 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012). 
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possibility of a one-year sentence does not sufficiently deter possession, the 
state could increase the maximum penalty to eighteen months, two years, or 
even more. Increasing criminal penalties for marijuana may deter some 
would-be “traffickers” (individuals who would have otherwise brought ma-
rijuana from a legalizing state into a prohibiting one).76 
There are, however, some serious drawbacks to relying on punitive 
criminal penalties to curb marijuana externalities. As has been well docu-
mented by Professor Gabriel (Jack) Chin, members of minority groups of-
ten bear the brunt of harsh criminal laws.77 Professor Chin has further ob-
served that the United States finds itself in the midst of an epidemic of both 
mass incarceration (an increase in the rate of imprisonment) and mass con-
viction (an increase in the rate of conviction, even if not leading to prison 
sentences).78 Such statistics and social truths may make lengthier sentences 
for marijuana use and possession ill-advised as a response to cross-
boundary spillover. Moreover, incarceration is expensive for the non-
legalizing state.79 
In other contexts, where some states have legalized what other states 
prohibited, Professor Donald Regan has advocated the application of “per-
sonal law.”80 By personal law, he posits that states can enact statutes prohib-
iting their citizens from traveling to other states to engage in conduct pro-
hibited in their Home States because each state has a “constitutionally per-
missible interest in the behavior of its citizens [that] does not stop at its ter-
ritorial boundaries.”81 From this premise, he reasons that a state “may regu-
                                                                                                                           
 76 Or not. “Despite these stiff penalties for possession, distribution, and production of mariju-
ana, marijuana sellers and users do not seem to be deterred, possibly in-part due to a lack of gov-
ernment enforcement.” Melanie Reid, The Quagmire That Nobody in the Federal Government 
Wants to Talk About: Marijuana, 44 N.M. L. REV. 169, 187 (2014). 
 77 See Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal 
Conviction, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 253, 254 (2002) (“[W]hile African Americans are not 
more likely to commit drug crimes than members of other races, they are much more likely to be 
arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to prison.”). 
 78 See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Con-
viction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1803–06 (2012) (noting that the number of Americans in prisons 
and jails has almost quadrupled since 1980). 
 79 See CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT INCAR-
CERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 9 (2012) (surveying forty states, and finding “the total per-inmate 
cost averaged $31,286 and ranged from $14,603 in Kentucky to $60,076 in New York”). 
 80 See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1865, 1908 (1987). 
 81 See id.; see also id. at 1889 (“It is not so obvious that Georgia may not regulate the sexual 
behavior of Georgians in Illinois as it is that Georgia may not regulate the sexual behavior of Illi-
noisans in Illinois. States may have some power to legislate extraterritorially where the behavior 
of their own citizens is concerned.”). 
878 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:863 
late the extraterritorial behavior of its citizens.”82 Under personal law theo-
ry, a prohibiting state could enact a law making it a crime for one of its citi-
zens to visit another state and consume marijuana.83 
Professor Regan confesses that he is not “pleased [with personal law] 
on policy grounds.”84 Nor am I. Although arguably constitutional,85 person-
al law is a draconian response, particularly to the problem of marijuana 
spillover. If such a theory works, as Professor Regan admits, it would pro-
hibit non-New Jerseyans or Nevadans from taking a vacation in Atlantic 
City or Las Vegas to gamble.86 These laws would prohibit non-Nevadans 
from visiting brothels in those counties in Nevada where prostitution is le-
gal. They would prohibit Nebraskans from traveling to Colorado and smok-
ing a joint. Make no mistake about it, under Professor Regan’s formulation, 
the Nebraskan who travels to Colorado and tokes a joint would be guilty of 
a crime. In an era of mass incarceration, mass conviction, and teeming jails 
and prisons,87 creating additional crimes—for engaging in conduct that is 
legal where undertaken—does not seem like a wise option.88 Moreover, 
such a solution poses significant problems with detection and enforcement, 
and, as always in the criminal justice system, the attendant specter of racial-
ly discriminatory enforcement looms. 
Given the drawbacks of personal law, a non-legalizing state may 
choose to enact a law making it illegal, not for the in-state citizen to travel 
to the neighboring state to gamble, fornicate, or partake of marijuana, but 
for the out-of-state business to permit the in-state citizen to engage in those 
acts. Professor Richard Fallon discussed such a possibility with respect to 
providing abortion services in the event the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 
                                                                                                                           
 82 Id. at 1912. 
 83 Professor Richard Fallon explains that such a law may be constitutional under the Due 
Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses because “a state has an enduring contact with its citi-
zens and an interest in their well-being.” See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abor-
tion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 630 (2007). Professor 
Fallon continues, “I would not pretend to pronounce a confident judgment on whether, following 
the overruling of Roe v. Wade, the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses would permit a 
pro-life state to make it a crime for its citizens to procure abortions in other states.” Id. at 632. 
 84 Regan, supra note 80, at 1912. 
 85 Or not. I express no opinion on this point in this paper. 
 86 See Regan, supra note 80, at 1909. 
 87 See Chin, supra note 78, at 1803–04; Vitiello, supra note 17, at 1352 (“Proponents of legal-
izing marijuana can also point to the selective enforcement of drug laws. Despite survey data sug-
gesting that the same proportion of whites, Hispanics, and African Americans use illegal drugs, 
enforcement falls far more heavily on minority communities.”). 
 88 It also seems an incomplete solution to the spillover problem, at least when it comes to 
marijuana, because is not just Home State citizens who bring marijuana from the legalizing Host 
State into the prohibiting Home State. 
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holding in Roe v. Wade were overruled.89 He explains that a state that pro-
hibits abortion might want to make it unlawful for its citizen to obtain an 
abortion, even in a different state that permitted abortions and by a doctor 
from that different state.90 Professor Fallon admits he is not sure whether 
such an approach would satisfy constitutional standards,91 but he posits that 
determination involves “whether the [Home] state’s interest in the life of a 
fetus gave it a sufficient ‘contact’ to make the exercise of its regulatory ju-
risdiction neither ‘arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.’”92 If Professor Fal-
lon’s hypothetical law is constitutional, or even arguably constitutional, an 
entrepreneurial non-legalizing state could enact such a law against out-of-
state dispensaries. 
This sort of law, like Professor Regan’s personal law, also imposes too-
harsh penalties, at least for the personal use of marijuana.93 First, a state’s 
interest in reducing marijuana within its borders almost certainly pales in 
comparison to the state’s interest in fetal life. In fact, as Professor Fallon 
admits that the constitutionality of his theory hinges on the compelling na-
ture of the state’s interest, the theory seems best limited to instances in 
which one can argue that fundamental rights are at stake. Marijuana use has 
not been deemed a fundamental right, nor is it likely to be.94 
Second, the primary problem for the non-legalizing state is not that an-
other state has legalized cannabis or that non-Home State individuals are get-
ting high in the legalizing state, but rather the spillover into the non-legalizing 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Fallon, supra note 83, at 627. 
 90 Id. Although Professor Fallon limited his remarks to abortion, they apply to other alleged 
vices legal in one state but illegal in another. Today, we could add assisted suicide, gambling, and 
prostitution to the list; in the not-too-distant past, no-fault divorce and gay marriage would make 
the list as well. 
 91 See id. at 633. 
 92 Id. (quoting Phillips Petrol. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985)). 
 93 This sort of law may also be too difficult—if not impossible—to enforce in the casino con-
text, though perhaps easier with marijuana. With respect to gambling, a Home State citizen could 
legally travel to Nevada and legally enter a casino. The moment she put a dollar in a slot machine, 
however, the casino would face criminal liability. A casino could place security guards at the 
doors to keep out-of-staters outside. That would, of course, come at the cost of losing all the legal 
in-casino sales of liquor, high-end merchandise, shows, and food. Professor Fallon also thought 
that issues of notice would be a problem in the abortion context. He explained that “[i]ssues of fair 
notice might also arise if a [Host State] doctor had no reasonable way of knowing whether a pa-
tient resided within an anti-abortion state or whether her fetus was conceived there.” Id. Regarding 
marijuana sales, this proposed statute is easier to enforce. In jurisdictions that currently have legal-
ized medical or recreational marijuana, the dispensary employees already must confirm the identi-
ty of the purchaser—and when they see identification from a prohibiting state, the employees can 
turn the marijuana-seeker away. 
 94 Courts have held that marijuana possession and use is not a fundamental right. See Raich v. 
Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Maas, 551 F. Supp. 645, 647 
(D.N.J. 1982). 
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state. If the Home State citizen travels to a legalizing state, smokes a single 
joint there, and returns home the next day clear-eyed and sober, thus impos-
ing no additional costs on his Home State, there is no substantial justification 
for reaching across the border and imposing criminal punishment on the out-
of-state dispensary.95 In other words, the law does not seem sufficiently tai-
lored to remedy the scope of the extraterritorial harm. 
Each of these three criminal statutory solutions seems overly draconian 
and not appropriately adapted to handle the limited problem of marijuana 
spillover. So what is a proportionate response to the problem of cross-
boundary spillover, one that responds more directly to the problem of trans-
boundary spillover, yet does not rely on heavy-handed criminal penalties? 
B. Gram Shop Act 
Prohibiting states should consider enacting statutes, modeled on extant 
dram shop laws, to impose civil liability on marijuana sellers when their 
sales to Home State citizens cause harm in the Home State or to Home State 
residents.96 Dram shop laws permit imposition of liability on bars, restau-
rants, and liquor stores arising out of the sale of alcohol to already intoxi-
cated persons or minors who subsequently injure third parties.97 Modified 
dram shop laws—appropriately called “gram shop” laws98—are less harsh 
than the criminal laws explored in the previous section because gram shop 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Similarly, if the Home State citizen goes to Nevada, gambles away a couple of hundred 
dollars, and returns to his Home State, the Home State has not been meaningfully harmed (at least 
not any more than if the Home State citizen had eaten an expensive dinner in Nevada). In that 
scenario, the Home State should not be able to reach into Nevada to impose criminal liability on 
the out-of-state casino for permitting an in-state resident to gamble where there is no in-state 
harm. Professor Fallon’s thought experiment regarding abortions can be distinguished because of 
the fundamental rights at stake. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (discussing Profes-
sor Fallon’s thought experiment). 
 96 Legalizing states may also enact such laws, just as states with legal liquor sales have dram 
shop liability. See infra note 121 and accompanying text (noting states with dram shop liability). 
 97 To establish liability under a dram shop law, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: 
1. There must be an intoxicating liquor. 
2. The intoxicant must be transferred by the defendant. 
3. The transferee must consume the transferred intoxicant. 
4. The transferee must become intoxicated. 
5. The intoxicated transferee must cause an actionable injury to the plaintiff. 
6. The intoxication must have a causal connection with plaintiff’s injury. 
7. The plaintiff must be of a class entitled to recover under the Act. 
12 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE TRIALS § 729 (1966, updated Mar. 2017). 
 98 See Michael E. Bronfin, Comment, “Gram Shop” Liability: Holding Drug Dealers Civilly 
Liable for Injuries to Third Parties and Underage Purchasers, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 345, 353–
54. Mr. Bronfin suggests holding drug dealers liable. This Article recommends a potentially 
broader application against legal, but out-of-state, sellers. 
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laws impose civil liability rather than criminal penalties. The gram shop law 
is also arguably an improvement because it supplies civil liability in limited 
circumstances—that is, only when there is cognizable in-state harm. On the 
other hand, gram shop liability is certainly more protective of Home State 
interests than the status quo of doing nothing and wishing the harms would 
go away on their own or by relying solely on failed (and failing) litigation 
techniques. 
Gram Shop Acts would allow non-legalizing states to modify and ex-
pand a weapon already likely in their arsenals99 to help force dispensaries to 
bear the cost of the harm they cause and thereby ultimately to help deter the 
widespread sale of marijuana to Home State citizens.100 Subsection 1 dis-
cusses how the type of laws enacted to combat the negative effects of alco-
hol sales can be used to combat the negative effects of marijuana.101 Sub-
section 2 proposes and discusses a model Gram Shop Act.102 
1. Dram Shop to Gram Shop 
Liquor laws provide compelling templates for marijuana laws: Although 
the state-sanctioned sale of marijuana is a relatively new phenomenon in the 
United States, the state-sanctioned sale of liquor is not, and liquor consump-
tion presents many of the same issues that marijuana consumption does.103 
Drinking alcohol suppresses inhibitions and so can cause people to act stupid-
ly, and it impairs judgment and muscle control. Inebriated persons may drive 
when they are unable to adequately control their vehicles,104 or perform acts, 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Not every state has dram shop liability, but most do. See infra note 121 and accompanying 
text (noting states with dram shop liability). 
 100 Gram shop liability provides a useful supplement to the nuisance law theory advocated by 
Professors DeVeaux and Mostad-Jensen for at least two reasons. See supra notes 60–61 and ac-
companying text (discussing such theory). First, the federal common law of nuisance has fallen 
into disuse since the environmental statutes of the 1970s came into effect. It is not at all clear that 
the U.S. Supreme Court will revive that area of the law and expand it to cover the “pollutant” 
marijuana. Second, the Gram Shop Act will provide a clear statutory cause of action to a person 
injured by an out-of-state marijuana sale. Not only will gram shop liability aid prohibiting states in 
the form of deterrence, but it may also aid the public at large. “[E]mpirical studies have found that 
implementation of dramshop liability lowers motor vehicle fatality rates as well as fatality rates 
for other alcohol-related causes such as liver cirrhosis and homicides.” Frank A. Sloan et al., Lia-
bility, Risk Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars, 43 J.L. & ECON. 473, 497 (2000). 
 101 See infra notes 103–129 and accompanying text. 
 102 See infra notes 130–141 and accompanying text. 
 103 One group, called the Campaign to Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol, led the failed cam-
paign in favor of Arizona Proposition 205, which proposed to fully legalize marijuana. See Our 
Campaign, REGULATE MARIJUANA LIKE ALCOHOL, https://www.regulatemarijuanainarizona.org/
about/ [https://perma.cc/C49X-WZDC] (last visited Mar. 30, 2017). 
 104 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention maintains a website showing the effects of 
alcohol on a driver’s ability to control a vehicle. See Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, CTRS. FOR 
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such as assault, battery, or disorderly conduct, that they would not commit 
while sober.105 Indeed, with alcohol suppressing inhibitions and judgment, 
they may do a variety of acts they would not undertake if they were unim-
paired. Similarly, because marijuana consumption weakens ability to focus, 
impairs short-term memory and motor skills,106 and decreases judgment,107 
marijuana use leads to increased numbers of car accidents. Drivers who have 
marijuana in their systems are roughly twice as likely to be involved in both 
fatal and non-fatal collisions.108 Thus, marijuana, like alcohol, leads people to 
drive when they should not,109 commit acts they might not undertake if clear-
headed,110 and behave in other ways they ought to avoid.111 
To combat the negative effects of too much liquor consumption, states 
have enacted a wide variety of laws. These range from criminal responses, 
such as DUI laws and drunk and disorderly laws,112 to administrative re-
sponses, such as controls on liquor licenses113 and suspension of licenses of 
                                                                                                                           
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/
impaired-drv_factsheet.html [https://perma.cc/44QB-BY2N] (last visited Feb. 19, 2017). 
 105 See Antonia Abbey et al., Alcohol and Sexual Assault, 25 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 43, 
43 (2001) (noting that “[a]pproximately one-half of [all sexual assaults] involve alcohol consump-
tion by the perpetrator, the victim, or both”). 
 106 Itai Danovitch, Sorting through the Science on Marijuana: Facts, Fallacies, and Implica-
tions for Legalization, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 91, 94 (2012). 
 107 Hayley Dean, Through the Haze: Fashioning a Workable Model for Imposing Civil Liabil-
ity on Marijuana Vendors, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 611, 619 (2014). 
 108 Id. at 616. 
 109 See Matt Schmitz & Chris Woodyard, Marijuana Playing Larger Role in Fatal Crashes, 
USA TODAY (June 9, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2014/06/09/marijuana-
accidents/10219119/ [https://perma.cc/PX3N-SH2E] (noting that marijuana played a role in 12% 
of car accident deaths in 2010 and that Colorado has seen an increase in driving fatalities from 
marijuana since medical marijuana dispensaries became legal in Colorado). 
 110 See C. Heather Ashton, Pharmacology and Effects of Cannabis: A Brief Review, 178 BRIT-
ISH J. PSYCHIATRY 101, 104 (2001) (noting that marijuana can cause “dysphoric reactions, includ-
ing severe anxiety and panic, paranoia and psychosis . . . including aggravation or precipitation of 
schizophrenia”). 
 111 Some studies also suggest that long-term consumption of marijuana harms the brain. See 
NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MARIJUANA 16–19 (2017). Alcohol has similar negative long-term 
health effects. See generally NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, ALCOHOL’S 
DAMAGING EFFECTS ON THE BRAIN (2004) (highlighting some of the effects of heavy drinking in 
the long-term). In this respect too, then, liquor and marijuana are similar. 
 112 See Katherine L. Hanna, Comment, Old Laws, New Tricks: Drunk Driving and Autono-
mous Vehicles, 55 JURIMETRICS J. 275, 277–79 (2015) (providing an overview on DUI laws); see 
also Colby J. Morrissey, Note, Anonymous Tips Reporting Drunk Driving: Rejecting a Fourth 
Amendment Exception for Investigatory Traffic Stops, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 167, 168 (2010) 
(noting how frequently drunk driving is committed).  
 113 See generally J.B. Glen, Power to Limit the Number of Intoxicating Liquor Licenses, 163 
A.L.R. 581 (1946) (noting the ability of states to limit the number of liquor licenses). 
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those convicted of DUI or who refuse blood alcohol tests,114 to civil re-
sponses, such as civil liability against drunk drivers (ordinary negligence 
actions) and civil liability against alcohol sellers (dram shop laws).115 
The same responses created to combat the negative externalities of al-
cohol can be used, and are being used, to combat the negative effects of ma-
rijuana. Indeed, states have enacted criminal laws to combat marijuana con-
sumption and sales, at least in states that continue to criminalize such use.116 
Of course even legalizing states continue to criminalize improper activities, 
such as impaired driving.117 States also have responded administratively to 
marijuana. In prohibiting states, there is little need for administrative re-
sponses, such as licensing, given marijuana’s illegal status, though the state 
may suspend the driver’s license of an individual who has been convicted of 
drugged driving. Legalizing states do have administrative apparatuses de-
signed to control licensing and sales.118 Regarding civil actions, states per-
mit liability directly against the drugged driver.119 Some states have even 
passed laws imposing civil liability on drug dealers.120 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See generally Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (permitting warrantless 
breathalyzer tests on DUI suspects, and permitting a state to suspend the driver’s license if he 
refuses the test). 
 115 See infra note 121 and accompanying text (noting states with dram shop liability). 
 116 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 20–2–23(b)(3) (2016) (listing “marihuana” as a Schedule I con-
trolled substance); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3405 (2010) (describing the crimes associated with 
marijuana). 
 117 In some states, it is a crime to drive “with any amount of marijuana . . . including the me-
tabolites and derivatives of marijuana . . . . In other states, it is a crime to drive ‘under the influ-
ence’ of marijuana.” FLEM K. WHITED III, DRINKING/DRIVING LITIGATION: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL 
§ 16:19 (2d ed. 2016). 
 118 See, e.g., Application and Licensing—Marijuana Enforcement, COLO. DEP’T. OF REVENUE, 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/application-and-licensing-marijuana-enforcement 
[https://perma.cc/KWD8-QYYD] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).  
 119 General tort principles should permit liability against the drugged driver who, after all, is 
the proximate cause of the accident.  
 120 See Bronfin, supra note 98, at 346–52; see also ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-124-102–16-124-
112 (2015); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11700–11730 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 13-21-801–13-21-813 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 772.12 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-46 (2015); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 663E (2015); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 57/1–85 (2016); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 34-24-4 (West 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.61–9:2800.76 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§§ 691.1601–691.1619 (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 318-C:1–318-C:18 (West 2017); N.J. 
REV. STAT. §§ 2C:35B-1–2C:35B-9 (2016); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 12-101–12-110 (McKin-
ney 2015); 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2-421–2-435 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-54-10–44-54-140 
(2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-20C-1–34-20C-19 (2017); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 29-28-101–
29-28-116 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37e-1–58-37e-14 (2016); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 
§§ 641–658 (2016). Such responses are a start toward a resolution, but are not sufficient. Not all 
sales of marijuana are illegal. Further, not all sales occur in-state. Gram shop liability that could 
also be applied against state-sanctioned legal out-of-state dispensaries is necessary to supplement 
these sorts of laws. 
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What about, however, a more robust civil liability statute—one that not 
only operates within a state, but also has the potential to reach across state 
borders from a non-legalizing state into a legalizing one to force marijuana 
dispensaries to pay for some of the harms they create? As a matter of drafting, 
such a statute poses no significant hurdles. Indeed, most states already have 
dram shop laws,121 which may operate both in-state and extraterritorially.122 
Although these laws vary in detail,123 the laws generally permit restaurants, 
bars, and liquor stores to be held liable for selling alcohol to minors124 or al-
ready intoxicated individuals who cause injuries as a result of their intoxica-
tion. Dram shop laws enable the third-party victims to sue the bar or restau-
                                                                                                                           
 121 The National Conference of State Legislatures (“NCSL”) publishes a list of states that 
have dram shop liability. See Dram Shop Civil Liability and Criminal Penalty State Statutes, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/dram-
shop-liability-state-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/3SF7-YJ9J] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (list last 
updated in June 2013). The NCSL places the number of states with dram shop statutes at thirty. Id. 
Other U.S. jurisdictions may have dram-shop liability by court decision. See Westlaw, Dram Shop 
Statutes, 0110 SURVEYS 65 (Dec. 2015) (finding the following U.S. jurisdictions do not have 
dram shop liability: Kansas, Maryland, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). 
 122 Clearly, dram shop laws impose liability in purely in-state situations to combat over-
zealous sales in their own states. Dram shop laws, however, may also impose liability for the pro-
vision of liquor in one state that results in harm in another. See Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 
P.2d 719, 726 (Cal. 1976), abrogated by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 2016). Similarly, 
although Gram Shop Acts may be useful tools for legalizing states to deter over-selling or selling 
to minors, the focus of this Article is how non-legalizing states may protect themselves, and thus 
how non-legalizing states may deploy gram shop liability. 
 123 Some states do not hold an establishment liable if the drunk patron injures only himself 
(so-called first-party dram shop liability), on the theory that the drunk person proximately caused 
his own injures by drinking the alcohol. For example, before the State of Indiana moved from 
contributory negligence to comparative fault, the intoxicated patron was barred from recovering 
for his own injuries. See, e.g., Davis v. Stinson, 508 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), supersed-
ed by statute, IND. CODE § 34-51-2-14 (2016), as stated in Gray v. D & G, Inc., 938 N.E.2d 256, 
260 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). After adoption of comparative fault, the intoxicated patron may 
recover, but in a reduced amount. Gray, 938 N.E.2d at 260–61. See generally Julia A. Harden, 
Comment, Dramshop Liability: Should the Intoxicated Person Recover for His Own Injuries?, 48 
OHIO ST. L.J. 227 (1987) (reviewing both positions on whether to include the drunk patron as a 
member of the protected class). Some states limit damages. Dram shop statutes may permit recov-
ery for three types of damages: injury to the injured person, injury to his property, and injury to 
means of support. 12 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE TRIALS § 729 (1966, updated Mar. 2015). “Not 
all the statutes encompass all three of these injuries.” Id. Other states require mandatory notice to a 
liquor establishment before it may be held liable for serving a “habitual drunkard.” See, e.g., CO-
LO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (2016). 
 124 Because the National Minimum Drinking Age Act made the states’ receipt of full federal 
highway funding dependent on accepting the minimum drinking age of twenty-one years old, all 
states have adopted that age. See National Minimum Drinking Age Act, Pub. L. No. 98-363, 
§ 6(a), 98 Stat. 435, 437 (1984) (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012)). Puerto Rico and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands permit persons eighteen years of age and older to drink. See P.R. LAWS 
ANN. tit. 13, § 32565 (2011); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 485 (2012). 
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rant directly, rather than relying solely on compensation from the over-served 
or under-aged intoxicated individual.125 In this way, dram shop laws have 
dual aims: to compensate the victim and also to protect the public by deter-
ring the sale of alcohol to minors and clearly intoxicated patrons.126 
The key to dram shop laws is their deterrence value. Bars and restau-
rants, aware of the possibility of a tort suit and potentially crippling judg-
ment, override their economic incentive to continue to serve intoxicated 
patrons and minors. Most research indicates that dram shop laws reduce 
driving injuries caused by alcohol.127 Without dram shop liability, these es-
tablishments have an economic incentive to sell more alcohol.128 With lia-
bility, the establishments must balance the economic disincentive of poten-
tially expensive litigation.129 Most U.S. states believe that this disincentive 
compels liquor stores, bars, and restaurants to consider these costs and ei-
ther change their behavior (by selling less alcohol) or internalize the eco-
nomic harm they create (by paying judgments). 
Marijuana dispensaries create externalities similar to those created by 
bars. Dispensaries may sell to minors or to already intoxicated patrons; they 
may sell to individuals intent on trafficking the marijuana to other states; 
they may sell more quantity to their customers than is permitted by law; and 
they may sell to individuals who then drive while under the influence and 
cause accidents or other harms because of their impairment. Without the 
threat of liability, marijuana dispensaries, like bars and restaurants, general-
ly have economic incentives to sell more and to worry less about the conse-
quences of doing so. With liability, these dispensaries must factor in the 
possibility of tort judgments, which may cause some owners to change their 
behavior and exercise more care regarding their sales. Entrepreneurs seek-
ing to open new dispensaries might not place them near the borders of non-
legalizing states that have dram shop laws; dispensaries may curb their ad-
vertising in non-legalizing states or in media that easily cross state bounda-
                                                                                                                           
 125 The victim may sue the intoxicated person instead of the bar, or in addition to it, using 
normal tort principles. The purpose of the dram shop laws (and the proposed Gram Shop Act) is to 
cast a wider liability net to redress harms to include the seller, particularly given the fact that the 
seller is often better capitalized than the impaired driver. 
 126 See Sloan et al., supra note 100, at 499 (noting that tort law can deter excessive alcohol 
consumption); Harden, supra note 123, at 232 (discussing Ohio’s dram shop law and stating that 
the “statute certainly intends to protect the public”). 
 127 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Making Liquor Immunity Worse: Nevada’s Undue Protection of 
Commercial Hosts Evicting Vulnerable and Dangerous Patrons, 14 NEV. L.J. 866, 874 (2014). 
 128 At some point, the economic incentives may flatten out or even run the other way; for 
example, if the patron becomes so intoxicated that he or she becomes unruly and destructive, the 
establishment will have an incentive to cut him or her off, even without dram shop liability. 
 129 See Sloan et al., supra note 100, at 484 (“In states with strict dramshop laws, [bar owners] 
perceived a higher probability of being sued for serving an obviously intoxicated adult.”). 
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ries, such as the internet, radio, or television; dispensary employees may 
more carefully review their patrons’ forms of identification to see if they 
reside in non-legalizing states; and ultimately dispensaries may not sell ma-
rijuana, or may sell less in quantity, to citizens from non-legalizing states 
that impose gram shop liability. 
2. Model Act 
A model Gram Shop Act, drafted here for Nebraska, a non-legalizing 
state that borders a legalizing state (Colorado), could provide as follows: 
A. A person who furnishes marijuana to a resident of Nebraska 
may be liable in damages to an injured third party if the Nebras-
kan to whom the marijuana is furnished consumes the marijuana 
and, while under the influence thereof, causes personal injury in 
Nebraska or to any resident of Nebraska.130 
B. Definitions. For purposes of this section the following defini-
tions apply: 
 1. “Person” means any individual or company or business or 
any employee thereof, except any federally permitted researchers 
or facilities running a drug trial approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration under the Controlled Substances Act.131 
 2. “Furnish” means to sell, exchange, barter, deliver, give, make 
available, or provide in any manner. 
 3. “Marijuana” includes any consumable product containing 
Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the principal psychoactive constit-
uent of cannabis. 
 4. “Resident” means someone who has an in-state address at 
which he or she presently resides. 
                                                                                                                           
 130 As explored throughout this Article, the Gram Shop Act would certainly protect Home 
State citizens who are injured. The Act, however, also protects out-of-state citizens who are in-
jured in the Home State; that is, even if the injured plaintiff is not a Nebraskan, Nebraska’s inter-
est in keeping its roads safe may be sufficiently great to allow the state to apply its gram shop law 
to protect this individual as well. As a matter of drafting, this statute could have reached even 
farther. For example, the statute could cover situations in which the dispensary furnishes marijua-
na to a non-Nebraskan who then injures a Nebraskan in Nebraska. Such a statute, however, is 
more likely to suffer from constitutional infirmities, as the out-of-state dispensary has no notice 
that such a consumer may have ties to a prohibiting state, and thus can do nothing to protect itself 
other than refusing to sell marijuana to non-Colorado citizens (or perhaps refusing to sell to any-
one at all). To avoid this Due Process challenge, the statute has been more narrowly drafted. 
 131 See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.18 (2016) (describing research protocols for Schedule I controlled 
substances); see also U.S. Drug Enf’t Agency, supra note 22 (discussing requirements for clinical 
trials on cannabidiol). 
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 5. “While under the influence” means the person is affected to 
the slightest degree. 
 6. “Damages” include compensatory damages, pain and suffer-
ing, and punitive damages. 
* * * 
This law has aspects that favor the dispensary and aspects that favor 
the injured plaintiff. Aiding the injured plaintiff is the fact that the law pro-
vides some opportunity for recovery for injuries, even if the other driver—
the one who consumed the marijuana and caused the accident—lacks the 
resources to pay a tort judgment. Also aiding the plaintiff is that the statute 
imposes strict liability in the sense that the dispensary employees’ state of 
mind is irrelevant; short of refusing to sell to the Nebraskan or selling only 
in an amount that could not render a person “under the influence,” the dis-
pensary cannot protect itself from liability.132 And unlike dram shop laws, 
the purchasing Nebraskan need not show signs of intoxication at the dispen-
sary to trigger liability against the dispensary. Indeed, such a requirement 
would render the statute largely ineffective, as marijuana purchased at dis-
pensaries, unlike alcohol purchased at bars and restaurants, must be re-
moved from the premises and consumed in the privacy of a home; marijua-
na generally cannot be consumed on-site.133 
Nevertheless, an injured plaintiff may encounter some difficulties in 
proof. Studies have shown that a THC level of 8.2 micrograms per liter 
leads to impaired driving.134 THC levels, however, dissipate quickly; a per-
son with a THC blood concentration of thirty-eight micrograms per liter 
might, within thirty minutes, have a concentration of only ten micrograms 
per liter.135 Unless the impaired driver is tested almost immediately, the test 
may prove inconclusive.136 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Many dram shop laws impose strict liability as well. See, e.g., Red Flame, Inc. v. Mar-
tinez, 996 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 2000) (noting that the Dramshop Liability Act utilizes strict liabil-
ity). 
 133 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.3-901(1)(a) (2016) (“Except as otherwise provided in 
this article, it is unlawful for a person . . . [t]o consume medical marijuana in a licensed medical 
marijuana center, and it shall be unlawful for a medical marijuana licensee to allow medical mari-
juana to be consumed upon its licensed premises.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.445(1) (2015) (“It 
is unlawful to . . . consume marijuana, useable marijuana, marijuana-infused products, or marijua-
na concentrates, in view of the general public or in a public place.”). 
 134 See Rachael Rettner, Riding High: Pot-Smoking Drivers Evade Blood Tests, LIVESCIENCE 
(Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.livescience.com/53578-marijuana-driving-thc-blood-test.html [https://
perma.cc/YE4V-PHH2]. 
 135 See id. 
 136 Conversely, THC can linger in the body long after its effects have dwindled, particularly if the 
person is a habitual user. See Anthony Rivas, Driving Under the Influence of Marijuana and Alcohol 
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To combat these difficulties of proof, a state like Nebraska, serious 
about prohibiting marijuana use and decreasing spillover, might consider 
various options, either singly or in combination. First, the state might rede-
fine “driving while impaired” as zero-tolerance for the presence of any 
measurable amount of marijuana in the system (THC or active or impair-
ment-causing metabolites).137 Currently, about twenty percent of U.S. states 
have a zero-tolerance drugged-driving law covering marijuana.138 Second, 
because of the rapid dissipation of THC and its metabolites, the state might 
consider allowing routine blood draws upon suspicion of impaired driving—
either with a warrant if a prosecutor is available to facilitate the application, 
or without one under the rubric of exigency, if no prosecutor is available and 
there is no other way to obtain the information expeditiously.139 Third, be-
cause of the constitutional problems with warrantless blood draws, a state 
might equip its police force with marijuana breathalyzers, the warrantless 
use of which should be upheld on the same theory as warrantless breatha-
lyzer tests for the presence of alcohol.140 Finally, if blood testing proves too 
difficult without a warrant and the new marijuana breathalyzers too expen-
sive or too untrustworthy, the state may permit proof of impairment by tes-
timony of a police officer trained in “Drug Influence Evaluation,” which 
includes an evaluation of the suspect’s appearance, movements, gaze, and 
ability to perform certain coordination tests.141 
                                                                                                                           
Impairs Driving Significantly, but Blame the Alcohol, MEDICAL DAILY (June 24, 2015), http://
www.medicaldaily.com/driving-under-influence-marijuana-and-alcohol-impairs-driving-significantly-
blame-339738 [https://perma.cc/7UL8-J5HL]. 
 137 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. At least one state, however, has narrowed its 
apparent zero-tolerance statute to cover only those metabolites capable of causing impairment. See 
Arizona ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris, 346 P.3d 984, 990 (Ariz. 2014). 
 138 Drug-Impaired Driving, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, http://www.ghsa.org/state-
laws/issues/Drug-Impaired-Driving [https://perma.cc/8FNW-U6FB] (last visited Feb. 19, 2017). See 
generally J. MICHAEL WALSH, A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF LAWS DEALING WITH DRIVING 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS 4 (2009) (providing an examination of each states’ statutes re-
garding driving under the influence of drugs). 
 139 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184 (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not permit 
routine warrantless blood draws in drunk driving cases); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 
1556 (2013) (holding that natural metabolization of alcohol by itself does not create a sufficient 
exigency to sidestep the warrant requirement in drunk driving cases, but leaving open the possibil-
ity of exigency in future cases). Because alcohol and marijuana dissipate at different rates, it may 
be possible that although alcohol dissipation does not create a per se exigency, marijuana dissipa-
tion does. 
 140 See Steven Nelson, Pot Breathalyzer Hits the Street, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 13, 
2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-13/pot-breathalyzer-hits-the-street [https://
perma.cc/X7A5-8S5V]. 
 141 See 8A NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE 2D AUTOMOBILES § 899 (updated Feb. 2017) (noting 
that describing the driver’s behavior can evidence that the driver is impaired). See generally H. 
Morley Swingle, Drug Recognition Experts in Missouri, 66 J. MO. B. 250, 252 n.37 (2010) (defin-
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In addition to the problem of gathering information regarding impair-
ment, an injured plaintiff may also encounter difficulties in getting impaired 
drivers to admit that they consumed marijuana purchased at an out-of-state 
dispensary. In the context of Gram Shop litigation, such information may be 
obtained during discovery, when the judgment-proof driver is subpoenaed 
as a witness. 
As with dram shop laws, however, the primary purpose of a Gram 
Shop Act is deterrence; therefore, these practical litigation problems, though 
certainly obstacles for litigants invoking the law, pose few problems for the 
Act’s normative goals. The possibility of a tort suit, with the attendant pos-
sibility of a large tort judgment or settlement, may well deter a marijuana 
dispensary from locating near the border of a non-legalizing state, from ad-
vertising in a non-legalizing state, from selling large quantities of marijuana 
to a citizen of a non-legalizing state, or from selling any marijuana products 
at all to that citizen. Though not a complete solution, the law provides a sol-
id start to curbing the excessive spillover. 
III. COMMENTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
In addition to the practical litigation problems a potential plaintiff may 
face when invoking the Gram Shop Act, this statute may also be vulnerable 
to constitutional and structural challenges, which will be fully addressed in 
a future companion Article. Although, on its face, this law applies to both 
in-state and out-of-state sales, the primary purpose of the law is to reach 
outside the non-legalizing state and deter sales by the extraterritorial dis-
pensary.142 The principally out-of-state focus leads to at least three interest-
ing legal questions. First, under what circumstances would a court in the 
non-legalizing state assert personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state de-
fendant? Second, would the court then apply its own gram shop law against 
such defendant? Third and finally, would such application be constitutional? 
Personal jurisdiction requires that the out-of-state dispensary purpose-
fully avail itself of the benefits and protections of the Home State.143 There 
is a fairly decent case for jurisdiction for some out-of-state dispensaries: 
Presumably, there will be numerous sales to Home State residents, includ-
                                                                                                                           
ing a Drug Recognition Expert (“DRE”) as “a specially trained law enforcement officer whose 
extra training allows him to personally examine a person and give an opinion as to whether that 
person is under the influence of a drug” and noting that, as of 2010, forty-six states have DREs 
certified by the International Association of Chiefs of Police). 
 142 Of course, there will be many legal sales if legalizing states enact Gram Shop Acts. 
 143 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case that 
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”). 
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ing the particular sale to the driver who caused the accident; the employees 
would have checked the tortfeasor’s identification, so they would be aware 
that they sold to a Home State citizen;144 the dispensary may have located 
itself near the border of the non-legalizing state, likely for the purpose—at 
least in part—of attracting as customers residents from that state, as there 
would be no competition from (legal) sellers in the non-legalizing state; any 
advertisements, websites, and mailers that reach across the border into the 
prohibiting state may create further contacts, particularly if the purchaser 
saw these advertisements and visited the dispensary because of them. Given 
that level of reaching out, it is plausible that if the injured plaintiff sued in 
the non-legalizing state, that state would assert jurisdiction over the out-of-
state defendant.145 
If the non-legalizing state asserts personal jurisdiction, then the state 
will likely apply its Gram Shop Act. As Professor Katherine Florey notes, 
“[I]t is normally a fair assumption that, so long as a state court has personal 
jurisdiction over [a] defendant, it probably has the power to apply forum 
law to her actions” regardless of whether those actions took place outside of 
the state, because “we are not accustomed to thinking of state courts’ rou-
tine choice-of-law decisions as raising serious extraterritoriality prob-
lems.”146 Indeed, in-state courts already feel free to apply their dram shop 
laws against out-of-state defendants.147 This makes sense. Courts are more 
familiar with their own laws and will likely apply them if given that option. 
The third issue—regarding constitutional challenges—finds its most 
troublesome hurdle in the dormant Commerce Clause, which bars states 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26140(a)(4) (West 2016) (requiring “a valid government-
issued identification card showing that the person is 21 years of age or older”); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 12-43.4-402(3)(b)(I) (2016) (“Prior to initiating a sale, the employee of the retail marijuana store 
making the sale shall verify that the purchaser has a valid identification card showing the purchas-
er is twenty-one years of age or older.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.3-901 (2016) (requiring med-
ical identification card to purchase medical marijuana); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3796.20(B)(1) 
(West 2016) (specifying that a “current, valid identification card” is needed). 
 145 Cf. Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 725 (Cal. 1976), abrogated by statute, CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 2016) (reaching choice-of-law issue without deciding personal jurisdic-
tion). 
 146 Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterri-
toriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1058–59 
(2009). That a court has such power does not, of course, mean that it will use that power to apply 
its own law. There may be reasons for finding that the law of some other jurisdiction is superior or 
that another state has more significant contacts or interests. 
 147 The most famous example is the Supreme Court of California’s 1976 case Bernhard v. 
Harrah’s Club. 546 P.2d at 726. Others include Zygmuntowicz v. Hospitality Investments, Inc., 
828 F. Supp. 346, 348, 354 (E.D. Pa. 1993), and Meyers v. Kallestaed, No. 91 C 20362, 1992 WL 
280450, at *1, *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1992). Conflict-of-laws issues are discussed more fully in the 
companion article. 
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from enacting legislation that interferes with the free flow of commerce.148 
Even this hurdle is lessening, however. A growing number of lower-court 
judges and academics believe that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits 
only economic protectionism,149 leaving states free to enforce non-
protectionist laws that regulate out-of-state conduct if that conduct touches 
a significant number of instate residents150 and the burden on interstate 
commerce is not excessive compared to the benefits.151 The Gram Shop Act 
should easily clear this low hurdle. 
Although the Act is hypothetical, we can surmise many legitimate pur-
poses for such a statute. Creating gram shop liability expresses moral con-
demnation of drugs and drug culture, protects Home State citizens from the 
harmfulness of both long-term and short-term drug use and may thereby 
decrease healthcare costs, on-the-job injuries, absences from work, job loss, 
and worker’s compensation and welfare claims. In addition, enacting a 
Gram Shop Act may decrease the likelihood of certain crimes such as disor-
derly conduct, vehicular manslaughter, and DUIs, may conserve police, 
healthcare worker, jail and prison, and judicial resources, safeguard the 
state’s roads, and help shield residents from observing drug use or its ef-
fects. Given these numerous and weighty interests and the deference given 
to states under this rational-basis-type review, it appears extraordinarily un-
likely that any court would find the burden on commerce “clearly exces-
sive” in comparison to these purposes. 
In brief, the prohibiting state should be able to assert personal jurisdic-
tion over the extraterritorial defendant; the prohibiting state’s courts should 
use their choice-of-law principles to apply the Home State’s Gram Shop Act 
against the dispensary; and such extraterritorial application should be up-
held as constitutional. 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Other constitutional issues that will be explored in the companion article include challeng-
es brought under the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
 149 See Energy & Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015) (explaining 
that the Supreme Court has struck down laws under the dormant Commerce Clause only when 
they involve “price control or price affirmation regulation . . . [that] link[] in-state prices to those 
charged elsewhere, with . . . the effect of raising costs for out-of-state consumers or rival business-
es”); Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 951 (9th Cir. 
2013) (extraterritoriality prohibition encompasses only “price control or price affirmation stat-
utes”). 
 150 IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 44 (1st Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. IMS Health Inc. 
v. Schneider, 564 U.S. 1051 (2011) (mem.). 
 151 E.g., id. at 42 n.51 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
892 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:863 
CONCLUSION 
State-by-state legalization of marijuana, while the drug remains illegal 
under federal law, presents significant federalism issues.152 It is, however, 
now a fact of life, and states that choose to remain drug-free must find ways 
to protect themselves from the negative consequences of their neighbors’ 
permissive pot policies.153 This Article offers one, admittedly incomplete, 
protective measure for non-legalizing states to use: Gram Shop Acts. 
From a prohibiting state’s perspective, the Gram Shop Act provides 
some defense against its neighbors’ marijuana industry. Assuming passage 
of a constitutional Gram Shop Act, owners of marijuana dispensaries might 
think twice before opening near the border of a prohibiting state, advertising 
in that state, or selling to a prohibiting state’s citizens. These actions would 
stem the flow of marijuana into the non-legalizing state. In turn, less mari-
juana into the state may translate to fewer accidents, intoxicated drivers, 
and disorderly conduct arrests, to name a few positive results. The Act may 
also make dispensaries more vigilant in policing the signs of intoxication, at 
least when dealing with non-resident buyers; and that, in turn, may further 
stem the external costs to non-legalizing states. 
Additionally, one day, a plaintiff—who has been injured by a marijua-
na-intoxicated but judgment-proof Nebraskan who bought cannabis in Col-
orado—may use the Gram Shop Act to sue the dispensary to recover for his 
or her injuries. If the plaintiff prevails, the dispensary, rather than Nebraska 
taxpayers, may help to make the injured plaintiff whole. 
A Gram Shop Act is not a panacea. It does not build a wall that pre-
vents marijuana immigration. It does not stop DUI accidents from occurring 
in Nebraska after Nebraskans get high from out-of-state cannabis. The 
Gram Shop Act may, however, provide some recompense for Nebraskans in 
the form of deterrence and for injured plaintiffs in the form of compensation 
for injuries. Without the Act, Nebraska only suffers from the legalization 
experiment; it accrues none of the benefits, such as increased tax and tour-
ism revenue and increased employment opportunities. With the Act, howev-
er, the playing field levels a bit as Colorado businesses account for the 
cross-boundary harm they inflict on their neighbors. 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Chemerinsky et al., supra note 23, at 77; see also Schwartz, supra note 30, at 569 (“Mari-
juana legalization by the states presents the most pressing and complex federalism issue of our 
time.”). 
 153 See Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federal-
ism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 83 (2014) (“[I]nterstate friction is a symptom of a healthy democracy 
rather than a disease unto itself.”). 
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Reefer madness is gripping the country, and the once-budding mariju-
ana industry is nearing full bloom. Perhaps prohibiting states will blaze the 
path through the haze. Or maybe not. At least now non-legalizing states 
have an option in addition to traditional litigation or increasing already 
harsh criminal penalties: the Gram Shop Act. 
  
 
